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I.

INTRODUCTION

The revitalization of inner city, low-income, and neglected
neighborhoods is an increasingly prevalent urban development trend that
produces benefits, but at major social costs.1 The adverse social effects of
revitalization and urban development practices reflect a nationwide housing
crisis from which the District of Columbia is not immune.2 In fact, the
District of Columbia is a prime example of a city struggling to overcome
the negative effects of revitalization and development.3 The most
problematic of these urban development practices is the conversion of
rental housing into expensive condominiums.4
1. See Michael Allen Wolf, HUD and Housing in the 1990s: Crises in
Affordability and Accountability, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545, 550-51 (1991)
(attributing homelessness to a decrease in affordable housing in revitalized
neighborhoods).
2. See Judith Bernstein-Baker, Cooperative Conversion: Is it Only for the
Wealthy? Proposals That Promote Affordable Cooperative Housing in Philadelphia,
61 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 393 (1988) (noting that the large amount of families on waiting
lists for public and low-income housing is indicative of a housing emergency);
Christopher A. Seeger, Note, The Fixed-Price Preemptive Right in the Community
Land Trust Lease: A Valid Response to the Housing Crisis or an Invalid Restraint on
Alienation?, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 471, 471 (1989) (characterizing the national housing
crisis as a “serious shortage” in affordable housing followed by extreme competition
over the minimal amount of available affordable housing).
3. See, e.g., John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old “OneTwo”: Gentrification and the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW.
L.J. 433, 458-59 (2003) (using statistics that demonstrate an exodus of low-income
families due to the demolition of public housing complexes). But see generally J. Peter
Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405 (2003) (listing the positive
outcomes of gentrification to include increases in property values, and thus tax
revenues, as well as employment opportunities due to new retail and public education
improvements).
4. See Adrienne Decuire, Edward Davis & Tamar Meekins, The Nightmare on
Main Street for African-Americans: A Call for a New National Policy Focus on
Homeownership, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 262, 271 (2008) (describing
the “rapid” transformation of the District of Columbia into “Condo City” as “another
loss”); Robert Chambers, Comment, Pushed Out: A Call for Inclusionary Housing
Programs in Local Condominium Conversion Legislation, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 355,
376 n.1 (2006) (defining conversion as the practice of “changing” rental apartment
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The District of Columbia’s recent urban development triggered a
widespread gentrification movement.5 A common result of conversion,
“gentrification” refers to the process of renovating “run-down
neighborhoods” to revitalize them and make them attractive to more
affluent residents.6 Gentrification disproportionately impacts vulnerable
populations; generally, these populations are low-income minority tenants
who are unable to afford the higher rents of converted apartments.7
Revitalization projects leave these victims of gentrification to suffer the
negative effects and battle the debilitating social costs of urban
development practices.8
This Comment argues that poorly enforced conversion controls facilitate
the District of Columbia’s housing crisis, despite multiple combative
legislative efforts, and that judicially imposed standards prevent tenants
from benefiting from legislative protections that aim to insulate lowincome populations from the negative social effects of urban development.9
Part II examines legislative efforts to address the District of Columbia’s
housing crisis through the promulgation of the Tenant Opportunity to
Purchase Act (“TOPA”) and TOPA’s recent amendments, and defines
TOPA’s judicial standard.10 Part III argues that the current judicial
standard regulating TOPA is flawed because the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”) misinterprets the law, analyzes the
negative impact of the improper standard, and explains how the judiciary
has defeated the purposes of TOPA.11 Part IV advocates for a new standard
buildings to condominiums).
5. See Powell & Spencer, supra note 3, at 451 (remarking that revitalization is a
form of “exclusive” development uniquely designed to ostracize low-income tenants
from their homes and neighborhoods to make space for affluent tenants).
6. See Ryan Howell, Note, Throw the “Bums” Out? A Discussion of the Historic
Preservation Statutes on Low-Income Households Through the Process of Urban
Gentrification in Old Neighborhoods, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 541, 555 (2008)
(defining gentrification as a process beginning with the renovation of run-down
neighborhoods, followed by the migration of professionals into these renewed
deteriorating areas, and ending in the displacement of poorer residents).
7. See Byrne, supra note 3, at 409 (pointing out that the District of Columbia’s
gentrification movement is unique as it exclusively involves white residents displacing
black residents).
8. See Jonathan Feldman, Regulating Condominium Conversions: The
Constitutionality of Tenant Approval Provisions, 21 URB. LAW. 85, 86 (1989)
(emphasizing that the effects of conversion, including the lack of affordable housing,
multiply when neighborhoods undergo contemporaneous gentrification).
9. See infra Part I (introducing the contributing causes of the District of
Columbia’s housing crisis).
10. See infra Part II.A (setting forth TOPA’s provisions, scope, and requirements).
11. See infra Part III.A-D (laying out the judiciary’s improper foundation for
interpreting the statute, analyzing two cases from the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals that illustrate the flaws of the current judicial standard, and articulating the
adverse effects of the Court of Appeals’ misguided analyses).
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that will effectively combat the continuing housing crisis in the District of
Columbia.12 Part V concludes that TOPA, if broadened, has the potential
to effectively regulate conversion and protect tenants from the negative
effects of development.13
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act
1. The District of Columbia’s Affordable Housing Crisis and the
Legislative Reaction
The District of Columbia is battling a nearly two decade-long housing
crisis that largely results from revitalization projects, a confluence of
developmental practices such as conversion, and the negative effects of
gentrification.14 The most disturbing social effects of conversion impact
vulnerable populations and include involuntary displacement of tenants,
depletion of available affordable rental housing, and rapidly increasing
housing costs.15
The District of Columbia City Council (“Council”) originally
promulgated TOPA in 1980 to address the District’s housing crisis.16 The
Council envisioned TOPA as a statutory tool to counter the negative
impacts of development and gentrification on the vulnerable, low-income
tenant population.17 Thus, the overarching goals of TOPA are to prevent
wholly, or at least minimize, involuntary tenant displacement resulting
from the conversion of rental property and to strengthen and protect
tenants’ rights.18 To further its designated purposes and alleviate the
12. See infra Part IV (explaining how the housing crisis will continue to persist
without either judicial or legislative action).
13. See infra Part V (calling for action to be taken to spur positive change and
address the housing crisis).
14. See Lynn E. Cunningham, Legal Needs for the Low-Income Population in
Washington, D.C., 5 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 21, 29-30 (2000) (observing that
approximately 7,000 households are waitlisted and 41,000 households are living at or
below the poverty level, yet there are only 30,000 low-income housing units available).
15. See Powell & Spencer, supra note 3, at 458 (interviewing low-income AfricanAmericans in the District of Columbia who believe gentrification forced them out of
their neighborhoods, as they did not have any control over the development process).
16. See Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act of 1980, D.C. CODE §§ 423401.01(a)(7), 42-3401.02 (2001 & Supp. 2010) (enacting TOPA to combat the costs
associated with urban development by stringently controlling conversion to effectively
preserve rental housing).
17. See Bernstein-Baker, supra note 2, at 404 (noting that legislative mechanisms,
such as statutory provisions guaranteeing tenants a right of first refusal, both allow
tenants to remain in their homes and protect tenants from forced displacement and
other detrimental effects of conversion).
18. See Sale Act § 42-3401.02 (listing the statutory purposes of TOPA to include
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adverse effects of the District of Columbia’s housing crisis, TOPA
regulates the sales of all rental housing accommodations by restricting the
right of housing owners to transfer property freely.19
2. Subsection (a): The Scope of TOPA
Subsection (a) codifies tenants’ statutory right of first refusal.20 TOPA
obligates all rental housing owners to give their tenants the opportunity to
purchase their rental housing unit before the owner sells the rental property
to a third party.21 This right is only triggered when the rental housing
owner attempts to “sell” the rental housing.22 However, subsection (a) does
not define what a “sale” is.23
3. Subsections (b) and (c): Two Overly Narrow Definitions of “Sale”
Unlike subsection (a), subsections (b) and (c) clearly define two ways in
which a transfer is a “sale” within the meaning of TOPA. Subsection (b)
categorizes a transfer pursuant to a written agreement as a “sale” if the
agreement possesses certain enumerated requirements.24 Subsection (c)
explicitly construes as a “sale” the transfer of a 100% ownership interest in
a business association to an individual third party.25
discouraging tenant displacement due to conversion, preserving affordable rental
housing, and balancing the “sometimes conflicting goals” of developers with the need
to protect low-income tenants).
19. See id. § 42-3401.03(11) (defining “housing accommodation” or
“accommodation” to be any form of rental housing with one or more units); see also
Chambers, supra note 4, at 376 (articulating that resale restrictions help ensure
affordable housing remains so for low-income tenants despite the contemporaneous
conversion of neighboring units).
20. See Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA), D.C. CODE § 42-3404.02(a)
(2001 & Supp. 2010) (requiring that rental housing owners provide tenants the
opportunity to purchase their rental housing accommodation prior to any “sale”).
21. See id. (codifying the tenants’ right of first refusal to purchase the property
prior to sale).
22. See id. (limiting the scope of TOPA to the sale of a housing accommodation);
see also Victoria A. Judson, Defining Property Rights: The Constitutionality of
Protecting Tenants from Condominium Conversion, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 179,
228 (1983) (explaining that statutory resell restrictions protect tenants, rather than
outside parties seeking an “economic gain” from the purchase of rental housing).
23. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 12, Twin Towers Plaza
Tenants Ass’n v. Capital Park Assocs., 894 A.2d 1113 (D.C. 2006) (Nos. 04-CV-1534,
04-CV-1575) (asserting that rental housing owners are only required to respect the
tenant’s right of first refusal if the transfer constitutes a “sale” that meets the 100%
ownership interest test because TOPA applies to “sales” and not to non-sale transfers).
24. See TOPA § 42-3404.02(b) (defining as a “sale” any agreement whereby the
rental housing owner relinquishes possession of the property, assigns to the other
contracting party all rights relating to the property, and requires the other contracting
party to pay property taxes and to maintain property insurance).
25. See id. § 42-3404.02(c) (including within the definition of “sale” transfers of
100% interest in a partnership or corporation that owns a rental housing
accommodation to one outside transferee).
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Thus, as originally written, a transfer is automatically a “sale” under
TOPA if it falls within the parameters of “sale” explicitly codified in
subsections (b) or (c).26 However, a major issue arises if subsections (b)
and (c) are inapplicable because the transfer then falls within subsection
(a), which fails to define a “sale.”27
B. Defining “Sale”: A Judicial Standard
The lack of a clear statutory definition of “sale” has already prompted a
wave of tenant-driven litigation.28 Lawsuits have charged rental housing
owners with TOPA violations arising from the alleged “sales” of rental
properties without first providing the tenants an opportunity to purchase.29
The influx of TOPA-based suits and lack of a statutory definition of “sale”
within subsection (a) of TOPA forced the Court of Appeals to delineate
TOPA’s scope.30
1. An “Absolute and General” Transfer
TOPA litigation first reached the Court of Appeals in 1994 when, as a
matter of first impression, the Court of Appeals defined “sale” in West End
Tenant Association v. George Washington University as only those
conveyances resulting in the transfer of “absolute title.”31 Throughout the
following decade, the Court of Appeals applied the West End definition of
“sale” to multiple types of transfers and ultimately produced a line of

26. See id. § 42-3404.02(b)-(c) (stating that the definition of “sell” or “sale”
encompasses transfers codified within subsections (b) and (c)).
27. See id. § 42-3404.02(a) (failing explicitly to define “sale” but mandating that
all “sales” trigger a tenant’s opportunity to purchase right).
28. See generally Aaron O’Toole & Benita Jones, Tenant Purchase Laws as a Tool
for Affordable Housing Preservation: The D.C. Experience, 18 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 367 (2009) (noting that there are ambiguities within
TOPA’s regulatory regime and scope because the definition of “sell” or “sale” lacks
clarity).
29. See Twin Towers Plaza Tenants Ass’n v. Capital Park Assocs., 894 A.2d 1113,
1115-16 (D.C. 2006) (claiming that the owner of the Twin Towers rental apartment
building violated TOPA when he transferred the majority of his ownership interest to a
third party without providing the tenants the opportunity to purchase the property); W.
End Tenant Ass’n v. George Washington Univ., 640 A.2d 718, 721 (D.C. 1994)
(claiming that the rental housing owner contravened the tenants’ statutory right to
purchase by failing to provide tenants the right of first refusal before transferring a
portion of his ownership interest to an outside party).
30. See West End, 640 A.2d at 727-28 (defining the word “sale” to mean the
“passing of the general and absolute title, as distinguished from a special interest falling
short of complete ownership”).
31. Compare id. at 727 (defining sale as a “contract whereby property is transferred
from one person to another for a consideration of value, implying the passing of the
general and absolute title”), with Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1119 (distinguishing “sale”
as defined in West End from a transfer of a “special interest falling short of complete
ownership”).
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holdings that articulated tests to aid in the determination of whether a
“sale” occurred for the purposes of TOPA.32
The Court of Appeals in Twin Towers Plaza Tenants Association v.
Capital Park Associates, L.P. applied the West End definition of “sale” to
transfers falling within subsection (a) of TOPA.33 Applying an “absolute
transfer” standard, the Court of Appeals held that transfers of less than an
owner’s entire interest in property fall short of complete ownership and do
not meet the requirements of a “sale,” as a “sale” within the meaning of
subsection (a) only pertains to conveyances that effectuate the passing of
“general and absolute title.”34
However, in 2009, in Gomez v.
Independence Management of Delaware, Inc., the Court of Appeals applied
the absolute transfer standard less restrictively while recognizing that a
transfer of 99% ownership interest could be a “sale” within the meaning of
subsection (a) of TOPA.35
2. A “Change in Ownership”
The Court of Appeals in Wallasey Tenants Association v. Varner further
clarified the Twin Towers “absolute transfer” test by requiring that
conveyances of rental housing accommodations effectuate a change in
complete ownership.36 The court emphasized the importance of a change
in ownership, as evidenced by the Wallasey per se requirement that a “sale”
must be made to an unrelated third party.37 This principle surfaced again in
Alcazar Tenants’ Ass’n v. Smith Property Holdings, L.P. when the Court of
Appeals affirmed that merely “moving property around” or restructuring
the form of ownership is not a “sale” within the meaning of TOPA.38
32. See Wallasey Tenants Ass’n v. Varner, 892 A.2d 1135, 1140-41 (D.C. 2006)
(requiring negotiations between third parties to trigger the right of first refusal if
individual economic gain, rather than legitimate business motives, prompted the
transfer); Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1119 (requiring “sales” to result in the “absolute
transfer” of ownership for consideration).
33. See Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1120 (holding that the transfer of 95%
ownership interest in a rental housing complex to a third party was not a “sale” within
the meaning of TOPA because it is neither a transfer of absolute title nor a conveyance
resulting in the transfer of the owner’s entire interest).
34. See id. at 1119 (reiterating that failing to convey the entire ownership interest
and title in rental housing does not effect an “absolute transfer” as contemplated by
West End and thus does not trigger TOPA).
35. 967 A.2d 1276, 1283 (D.C. 2009) (recognizing that the transfer may have been
a “sale” under subsection (a) if the transferee was the sole owner of the transferor at the
time of the transfer).
36. See Wallasey, 892 A.2d at 1140 (holding that the transfer of property from one
owner to a separate legal entity wholly owned by the original owner is not a “sale,” as
this is merely a change in the form of ownership but not in actual ownership).
37. See id. at 1140-41 (establishing that the transfer of property from a grantor, or
the original owner, to an entity wholly owned by the grantor is not a “sale” under
TOPA because the conveyance does not result in a “change of ownership or control”).
38. See 981 A.2d 1202, 1206-07 (D.C. 2009) (holding that the transfer of property
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Additionally, the unrelated third party must also engage in bargaining or
“arms-length” dealings prior to the conveyance.39 Wallasey established a
general exemption from TOPA that precludes transfers effectuated for the
purposes of “business convenience.”40
Subsection (b) governs transfers pursuant to a written agreement or
lease, and the standard for determining whether a “sale” occurred in under
subsection (b) differs from subsection (a)’s “absolute transfer” or change in
complete ownership test and is articulated in Columbia Plaza Tenants’
Ass’n v. Columbia Plaza Limited Partnership.41 A transfer of ownership
interest pursuant to an agreement must result in a change in the
“fundamental control of ownership” of the rental housing
accommodation.42 In subsequent cases, the Court of Appeals required
evidence of a general “relinquishment of possession” of the property to be
present before finding changes in the “fundamental control of
ownership.”43
C. 2005 Amendments
Prompted by the perpetual housing crisis, the Council amended TOPA in
2005 to combat the crisis more effectively by both broadening the scope of
the term “sale” and attempting to cut against judicially created standards.44
The 2005 amendments made three changes.
First, TOPA now categorizes any agreement as a “sale” if it mirrors the
terms of the transfer and agreement in West End.45 Second, the transfer of
from Smith Property Holdings to a trust entirely controlled and owned by Smith
Property Holdings was not a “sale” because it only changed in the form of ownership).
39. See Wallasey, 892 A.2d at 1140-41 (rationalizing the need for “arms’ length
dealings” to ensure the transfer constituted a sale within an “open market,” rather than
being a product of compulsion or forcing an owner to sell or buyer to buy against his or
her volition).
40. See id. at 1140 (pronouncing the per se rule that TOPA is not applicable when
property is conveyed for the legitimate purposes of estate planning, tax restructuring,
limiting liability, or general property management).
41. See generally 869 A.2d 329 (D.C. 2005) (recognizing that TOPA governs
conveyances resulting in a change in control not necessarily a change in complete
ownership).
42. See id. at 335-36 (holding that an agreement in which the owner conveys to a
third person the right to use, occupy, and control a portion or all of the housing
accommodation may be a sale, as it would likely result in a fundamental change in
control or ownership).
43. See id. (recognizing that for a written agreement to be construed as a sale under
TOPA prior to the 2005 amendments, the agreement must result in the owner
“relinquishing possession of the property”).
44. See Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA 2001), D.C. CODE § 423404.02 (2001), amended by Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Amendment Act of
2005 (Amended TOPA), D.C. CODE § 42-3404.02 (2001 & Supp. 2010) (retaining the
three original subsections yet slightly changing the definition of “sale”).
45. See Amended TOPA § 42-3404.02(b) (defining “sale” as an agreement
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any amount of ownership interest in rental property is a “sale” if it results
in a transfer governed by subsection (a).46
The second change effectively created a cyclical determination of
whether a transfer constituted a “sale.”47 It requires all transfers, regardless
of whether the transfer falls within subsection (b) or (c), to result in a “sale”
as contemplated by subsection (a).48 However, and most significantly, the
2005 amendments did not change subsection (a); thus, the inquiry of
whether a “sale” occurred continues to hinge on the standard of “sale” set
forth in subsection (a)—a standard that remains undefined.49
Consequently, the Court of Appeals continues to apply its standard as
established in West End to determine whether transfers constitute a “sale”
within the meaning of subsection (a).50
The third noteworthy amendment more directly affects the application of
TOPA. The 2005 amendments incorporated an express provision that
directs courts to examine the substance of the transaction and to consider
whether the parties entered into a transaction to avoid the obligation to
comply with TOPA’s stringent requirements.51
III. ANALYSIS
A. A Misunderstood Judicial Standard: The Failure of the Court of Appeals
to Understand the Plain Meaning of “Sale”
The judicial definition of “sale” resulted from faulty statutory
interpretation. The Court of Appeals made a fundamental error in
establishing its standard for “sale” when it failed to recognize that the plain
meaning of “sale” does not require an absolute transfer.52 Despite correctly
pursuant to which the owner relinquishes possession of the property, extends an option
to purchase, assigns all rights, requires the purchaser to pay taxes and purchase
insurance).
46. See id. § 42-3404.02(c)(1)(B) (encompassing within the definition of “sale”
conveyances pursuant to subsection (a)).
47. Id. § 42-3404.02(c)(1)(B)(i) (“The transfer of ownership interest in a
corporation . . . which owns an accommodation . . . which, in effect, results in the
transfer of the accommodation pursuant to subsection (a).”).
48. See id. § 42-3404.02(c)(1)(A)-(B) (construing as a “sale” transfers pursuant to a
written agreement that meet the requirements of “sale” in subsection (b) and that result
in a sale pursuant to subsection (a)).
49. Compare Amended TOPA § 42-3404.02, with TOPA 2001 § 42-3404.02(a)
(using exactly the same language in both versions of the statute).
50. See, e.g., Twin Towers Plaza Tenants Ass’n v. Capital Park Assocs., 894 A.2d
1113, 1120 (D.C. 2006) (concluding that the 2005 amendments did not nullify the
judicial test for “sale” and thus the judicial standard is the viable test).
51. See Amended TOPA § 42-3405.03(b) (amending TOPA without affecting the
judicial standard as the amendments apply prospectively only).
52. See W. End Tenants Ass’n v. George Washington Univ., 640 A.2d 718, 727
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identifying the proper methods of statutory interpretation when first
construing the term “sale,” the Court of Appeals strayed from those canons
of interpretation and failed to adopt the ordinary and common meaning of
the word “sale.”53 The West End definition of “sale” is derived strictly
from Black’s Law Dictionary.54 However, the West End standard reflects
only one of the multiple definitions of “sale” listed in Black’s Law
Dictionary.55 Furthermore, the most current version of the same dictionary
eliminated the definition of “sale” upon which the Court of Appeals so
heavily relied and opted for a more fluid and flexible standard.56
The Court of Appeals’ exact techniques for construing the plain meaning
of “sale,” together with an examination of the same dictionary definition
used by the Court of Appeals, clarify that the commonly accepted meaning
of “sale” is not strictly limited to transfers of an owner’s entire interest in
property.57 Yet, the court’s overly restrictive definition of “sale” explicitly
exempts from TOPA’s regime all transfers falling short of a conveyance of
complete ownership and thus markedly does not exemplify the common
meaning of the ordinary word “sale.”58 Due to the obviously absurd result
produced by a literal and constricted application of the judicial standard,
the Court of Appeals neglected its duty to adopt the plain meaning, or at
least inquire into whether another meaning would prevent absurdity.59
B. An Unintended Judicial Standard: The Failure of the Court of Appeals
(D.C. 1994) (refusing to “look beyond the plain meaning” of unambiguous statutory
terms when application of the “plain meaning” defeats statutory goals).
53. See id. at 727-28 (defining “sale” as an “absolute transfer”).
54. See id. at 727 (inferring, after examining only one edition of Black’s Law
Dictionary, a seemingly “universal consensus” that “sale” means an “absolute transfer”
of property).
55. See Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee in Opposition with Respect to the CrossAppeal at 5, Twin Towers Plaza Tenants Ass’n v. Capital Park Assocs., 894 A.2d 1113
(D.C. 2006) (Nos. 04-CV-1534, 04-CV-1575) (highlighting that the definition of “sale”
used by the Court of Appeals in West End is not even the first-listed definition in
Black’s Law Dictionary).
56. See id. at 5-6 (examining multiple legally-accepted definitions of “sale” to
conclude the term’s common meaning is not limited to absolute transfers but
contemplates all conveyances of property from one person to another for
consideration).
57. See id. (highlighting that no other jurisdictions, legal publications, or
commentaries define “sale” in such a narrow, inflexible manner that excludes transfers
short of complete ownership).
58. See, e.g., Twin Towers Plaza Tenants Ass’n v. Capital Park Assocs., 894 A.2d
1113, 1119 (D.C. 2006) (finding that the transfer of 95% ownership interest is
obviously not the same as the transfer of complete ownership interest).
59. See West End, 640 A.2d at 726-27 & n.14 (recognizing that courts cannot be
permitted to “wallow in literalism” if a term’s literal meaning or most common
definition results in absurd consequences the legislature could not have possibly
intended, and forbidding the adoption of the plain meaning if use of the word’s plain
meaning defeats the statutory goals).
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to Effectuate Legislative Intent and to Adhere to TOPA’s Mandatory
Interpretation Guidelines
The Court of Appeals failed to afford proper deference to legislative
history and wrongfully rejected the Council’s proposed and intended
standard of “sale” for the purposes of TOPA.60 Justifying its dismissal of
legislative history, the Court of Appeals contended that the Council did not
intend for its proposed “fundamental control” standard to govern.61
However, irrefutable evidence confirms that the Council unmistakably
intended for the standard construing “sales” under TOPA to be fluid and
flexible—two concepts embodied within the Council’s “fundamental
control” test.62
The Court of Appeals heard, and subsequently discredited, testimony
explicitly evidencing legislative intentions that “sale” signifies a
fundamental change in the control of ownership.63 Additional testimony
unambiguously illustrates the Council’s intention for “sale” to encompass
all conveyances that transfer the “benefits of ownership.”64 The Council
indisputably intended for all transfers resulting in a change in the
“fundamental control of ownership” to be “sales” for the purposes of
TOPA, yet the Court of Appeals’ standard of “sale” contravenes this
intention.65
The Court of Appeals justified ignoring the Council’s manifest desire to
incorporate the “fundamental control of ownership” standard in TOPA by
instead interpreting legislative silence as acceptance of the judicial
standard.66 Despite evidence to the contrary, the Court of Appeals felt a
60. See Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1120 (overlooking clear legislative history while
proclaiming that a “sale” covers “all changes in fundamental control of ownership”).
61. See id. (averring that the judicial definition of “sale” from West End controls
because the Council did not “purport to overrule it,” as the amendments failed to adopt
express language doing so).
62. See Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee in Opposition with Respect to the CrossAppeal, Twin Towers, supra note 55, at 11-12 (emphasizing that the Court of Appeals’
interpretation of “sale” directly contradicts clear legislative indication that “sale” is a
flexible term encompassing any “fundamental changes” in the control of a housing
accommodation).
63. See Columbia Plaza Tenants’ Ass’n v. Columbia Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 869 A.2d
329, 336 (D.C. 2005) (examining testimony asserting that the “fundamental control”
concept should not be defined as the transfer of 51% ownership interest but as a larger
transfer, such as the transfer of 75% or more).
64. See id. at 337 (asserting that a “sale” signifies “relinquish[ing] possession” of
property which requires giving up more control than the limited 28% ownership
interest transferred in this case).
65. Compare id. at 334 (acknowledging that the Council agreed that “sale”
encompasses all transfers resulting in changes to the fundamental control of
ownership), with W. End Tenants Ass’n v. George Washington Univ., 640 A.2d 718,
727-28 (D.C. 1994) (defining “sale” as an “absolute transfer,” not a mere change in the
control of ownership of rental housing).
66. See Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1120 (holding that the absence of language
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“particular lack of clarity” surrounded the “fundamental control” standard,
as the Council rejected similar proposed language to TOPA’s
amendments.67 The court interpreted this rejection as support that the
proper standard governing “sales” under TOPA is only met if an absolute
and total transfer of ownership interest to a third party occurred, rather than
a standard that hinges on a fundamental change in the control of
ownership.68
Moreover, in overlooking the Council’s clear intentions, the Court of
Appeals’ interpretation of TOPA violated the governing rules of statutory
interpretation.69 The court’s definition of “sale” not only contravenes the
more fluid and broader legislative definition of “sale” but also conflicts
with the overarching goals of TOPA.70 The judiciary failed in its duty to
further justice and prevent inequities when it narrowly defined “sale” and
ignored clear contrary legislative intentions in West End.71
Following West End, the Court of Appeals continued to further West
End’s restrictive and misunderstood definition of “sale,” prompting a
legislative reaction.72 For example, the Court of Appeals in Twin Towers
wrongfully ignored the expressed legislative intent evidenced in TOPA’s
amendments and applied West End’s rigid and inflexible standard.73 This
evidencing legislative intent in TOPA itself confirms that amendments to TOPA did
not overrule the standard of “sale” construed in West End and thus the judicial standard
remains current and viable).
67. See Columbia Plaza, 869 A.2d at 336 (discounting the importance of a
proposed amendment to TOPA that would have explicitly included within the term
“sale” the transfer of a majority of ownership interest).
68. See Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1120 (averring that the Council had multiple
opportunities to amend the Court’s definition of “sale” as defined in West End and its
progeny but the Council has not done so, thus, in failing to expressly amend TOPA, the
Council has not purported to overrule the judicial standard of “sale”).
69. See West End, 640 A.2d at 726 (contradicting canons of statutory interpretation
that mandate undefined terms must be defined so as not to contradict clear legislative
intent) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
108 (1980)).
70. See id. at 726 n.14 (recognizing that the judiciary’s duty is to remain “faithful
more to the purpose [of the statute] than the word” and that all judicially interpreted
statutory terms must not be at plain “variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole”) (citing United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)).
71. See id. at 727 (purporting to interpret “sale” in “accordance with the legislative
intent and common understanding to prevent absurdities and to advance justice” but
failing to do so).
72. See Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee in Response to the Supplemental Brief
for the Appellees/Cross-Appellant at 5, Twin Towers Plaza Tenants Ass’n v. Capital
Park Assocs., 894 A.2d 1113 (D.C. 2006) (Nos. 04-CV-1534, 04-CV-1575) (asserting
that TOPA is misunderstood by the “officials charged with protecting tenants rights”
and recognizing the definition of “sale” “has been misinterpreted to mean exclusively
that a sale can only take place when 100% interest is transferred in a real estate
transaction . . . . However, the law was never meant to treat the definition of sale in
such a narrow fashion”) (emphasis added).
73. See Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1119 (concluding, despite legislative intent to
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narrow interpretation of the term “sale” both conflicts with clear contrary
legislative intent and produces an absurd result by defeating the
overarching goals of TOPA.74
In addition to openly disregarding legislative intent, the Court of Appeals
outrageously ignored a clear statutory provision within TOPA designed to
guide this very type of judicial interpretation.75 Specifically, the Court of
Appeals cut against this provision in adopting West End’s restrictive
“absolute passing of title” definition of “sale.”76 When defining “sale,” the
Court of Appeals failed to apply the TOPA’s mandatory statutory
construction provision because its subsequent interpretation of TOPA
deprived tenants of the very rights it afforded them.77 The court’s
“absolute transfer” construction of “sale” does the opposite of
strengthening tenants’ legal rights, as the narrow definition only subjects
full and complete transfers of ownership in a property to TOPA’s
regulatory regime.78
In stark contrast to the Court of Appeals, the District of Columbia
Superior Court in Twin Towers properly deferred to the legislative intent
and statutory purposes of TOPA when it rejected the strict reading of West
End’s definition of “sale.”79 The Superior Court properly recognized the
duty of the judiciary to further TOPA’s protections when interpreting the
statute and recognized that exempting transactions like the one in Twin
Towers from TOPA allows owners to circumvent both “the heart and
the contrary, that West End controls, and therefore the 95/5 transfer was not a “sale”);
Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee in Response to the Supplemental Brief, Twin
Towers, supra note 72, at 10 (urging the Court of Appeals to defer to subsequent
legislative interpretation of an amended statute as evidence of legislative intent of the
original statute, mandating the alteration of West End’s narrow definition of “sale”).
74. See West End, 640 A.2d at 727-28 (claiming to examine the history prompting
TOPA’s enactment, the problems TOPA intended to address, and the prevalent
methods of statutory interpretation, yet failing to further TOPA’s purposes because a
narrow definition does not protect tenants as very few transfers will meet the “absolute
transfer” requirement of a “sale”).
75. See Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA), D.C. CODE § 42-3405.11
(2001) (requiring that courts interpret any ambiguity within TOPA toward
strengthening tenants’ rights).
76. See West End, 640 A.2d at 727, n.16 (denouncing TOPA’s provision requiring
the interpretation of ambiguous terms to be resolved in favor of “strengthening the
legal rights of tenants” because “sale” is not an ambiguous term, yet is commonly used
and has a clear ascertainable meaning).
77. See TOPA § 42-3405.11 (mandating that any judiciary interpretation of the
words in TOPA must be construed in a manner that strengthens tenants’ rights).
78. See, e.g., Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1119 (finding that the owner of the rental
apartment building had no obligations under TOPA because the owner retained a 5%
interest in the property and thus no “absolute transfer” occurred).
79. See Opening Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 6, Twin Towers Plaza
Tenants Ass’n v. Capital Park Assocs., 894 A.2d 1113 (D.C. 2006) (Nos. 04-CV-1534,
04-CV-1575) (relying on legislative history to define “sale” as encompassing the
conveyance or transfer of rights “associated with ownership”).
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substance” of TOPA and produces “obvious injustice.”80
C. Inconsistent Analyses and a Misapplication of the Judicial Standard in
Twin Towers and Alcazar
The Court of Appeals employed inconsistent and contradictory
reasoning, failed to recognize that the transfers in the cases of Twin Towers
and Alcazar constituted “sales” within the meaning of TOPA, and
negligently overlooked the motives and intentions prompting the transfers
at issue.81
1.

Erratic Analyses and Differing Standards

Following West End, a string of TOPA cases, starting with Columbia
Plaza in 2005 and ending with Alcazar in 2009, prevented tenants from
exercising their right of first refusal by inconsistently interpreting the Act.
Most significantly, the Court of Appeals in Twin Towers applied subsection
(a) of TOPA and used the West End definition of “sale,” whereas in
Alcazar it applied non-statutory exemptions and did not reference
subsection (a) of TOPA or West End.82 The following chronological
analysis illustrates how the Court of Appeals has interpreted “sale” to apply
contradictory standards.
In 2005, the Court of Appeals in Columbia Plaza recognized that less
than an absolute transfer could be a “sale.”83 Columbia Plaza demonstrates
the Court’s contemplation of situations whereby “sales” occur pursuant to a
partial transfer of interest.84 Under a restrictive standard, these transfers of

80. See id. at 6-7 (recognizing that constricting the definition of “sale” to exclude
all transfers short of 100% complete transfer of ownership interest would render
TOPA’s “tenant-protective provisions” ineffective, as nothing would trigger TOPA’s
requirements).
81. See Alcazar Tenants’ Ass’n v. Smith Prop. Holdings, L.P., 981 A.2d 1202,
1206 (D.C. 2009) (relying on the principles in Wallasey to exempt from TOPA the
transfer of a rental apartment building to a trust and later to a third party); Twin Towers,
894 A.2d at 1118-20 (applying West End’s definition of “sale” to conclude that TOPA
does not govern the transfer of 95% ownership interest).
82. Compare Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1118 (finding subsections (b) and (c)
inapplicable and thus solely inquiring whether the transfer constituted a “sale” under
subsection (a)), with Alcazar, 981 A.2d at 1206-07 (rejecting a subsection (a) analysis
and inquiring into whether the transfers constituted a “sale” under subsection (c)).
83. See Columbia Plaza Tenants’ Ass’n v. Columbia Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 869 A.2d
329, 335, n.7 (D.C. 2005) (construing a written agreement as a “sale” if a transfer
pursuant to the agreement leaves the original owner with minimal control over the
property).
84. See id. at 335 (including within the definition of “sale” agreements where the
owner “relinquishes control of property” by giving the third party control over the
property’s equipment, supplies, maintenance, and security, yet the original owner still
holds title to the property).
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partial interest will never meet West End’s requirements or constitute a
“sale” because “absolute title” will never pass when the original owner
never relinquished it.85 However, the Columbia Plaza court recognized
that these transfers are regulated by TOPA and accordingly defined “sale”
as a “change in fundamental control of ownership” and subsequently
incorporated that standard into West End’s definition of sale in the context
of written agreements.86
One year later, the Court of Appeals in Twin Towers failed to extend
Columbia Plaza’s modified interpretation of “sale” and reverted to the
“absolute transfer” definition of West End. The Twin Towers court
reasoned that Columbia Plaza’s definition could not apply because it was
limited to transfers pursuant to written agreements.87 However, the Twin
Towers court’s choice to adopt the West End definition is problematic
because the transfer in West End was also pursuant to a written agreement.
The facts of Twin Towers are just as distinguishable from West End as from
Columbia Plaza.88
Applying West End to Twin Towers while
contemporaneously excluding Columbia Plaza from the Twin Towers
analysis illustrates inconsistent reasoning, as the Court of Appeals
sporadically defined “sale” as a change in complete ownership in some
cases, while relaxing the standard to a change in control in other cases.89
Furthermore, if the Court of Appeals consistently applied its standard and
incorporated “all changes in fundamental control of ownership” as a factor
of “sales” within the context of subsection (a), the transfer of the Twin
Towers apartment building indisputably met that standard, as the transfer
resulted in the conveyance of every right associated with 100%
ownership.90
In 2009, the Court of Appeals in Gomez remanded to a lower court the
determination of whether a 99% transfer could constitute a “sale” under the
85. See id. at 337 (defining relinquishment of possession as giving up full, not
limited or partial, control over the property).
86. Id. at 336.
87. Compare id. at 337 (categorizing the contested transfer as the conveyance of a
minority interest or a 28% ownership in the property pursuant to a written agreement),
with Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1118 (categorizing the contested transfer as a
conveyance of a majority interest or 95% ownership interest in the property).
88. Compare W. End Tenant Ass’n v. George Washington Univ., 640 A.2d 718,
730 (D.C. 1994) (finding that the transfer of total control to a third party pursuant to a
written agreement constitutes a “sale”), with Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1120 (finding
that the transfer of 95% interest to a third party does not constitute a “sale”).
89. Compare Columbia Plaza, 869 A.2d at 336 (inquiring into whether a change in
“fundamental control” occurred), with Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1119 (inquiring into
whether “absolute transfer” occurred).
90. See Opening Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Twin Towers, supra note 79,
at 4 (arguing that West End and subsequent jurisprudence defined “sale” as a transfer
resulting in the fundamental change of control of ownership occurred).
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“absolute transfer” definition in West End.91 In contrast with the Court of
Appeals’ holding in Gomez, the Court of Appeals in Twin Towers failed to
expand the judicial standard of “sale” from West End and precluded any
transfer of less than 100% ownership interest from falling within TOPA’s
scope.92 Gomez directly conflicts with Twin Towers, as the Court of
Appeals in Gomez could not definitively hold that the transfer of 99%
interest constituted a special transfer of interest rather than an absolute
transfer of interest.93
In the same year, the Court of Appeals in Alcazar found that a complex
multi-step transfer fell entirely outside the scope of TOPA.94 The court
applied the Wallasey exemption while failing to rely on the necessary
analysis of underlying motives.95 The Alcazar court based its holding on
flawed reasoning since the principles of Wallasey did not apply to the
transfer in Alcazar because the facts between the two cases were too
“drastically different” to permit proper analogy.96
Unlike the transfer of the property in Wallasey, the transfer of the
Alcazar resulted in a change in the ultimate control of the property.97
Moreover, the transactions at issue in Wallasey involved only one party,
whereas the transactions in Alcazar involved multiple parties in addition to
the original owner of the Alcazar.98 Motivations of purely personal
91. See Gomez v. Independence Mgmt. of Del., Inc., 967 A.2d 1276, 1283 (D.C.
2009) (conceding that the transfer may be a “sale” under subsection (a)).
92. See Reply Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Twin Towers, supra note 23,
at 3 (acknowledging that a literal reading of the definition of “sale” as the transfer of
100% interest markedly excludes a transfer of 99% interest).
93. See Gomez, 967 A.2d at 1283 (remanding to determine whether the transfer of
99% ownership interest is a “sale” within the meaning of TOPA).
94. See Alcazar Tenants Ass’n v. Smith Prop. Holdings, 981 A.2d 1202, 1207
(D.C. 2009) (holding that the sale of a corporation controlling a trust that owned
property did not constitute a “sale” under the statute).
95. See Wallasey Tenants Ass’n v. Varner, 892 A.2d 1135, 1140 (D.C. 2006)
(exempting from TOPA transfers not made during “arms’ length dealings,” transfers
resulting in a change in the form of ownership and not an actual change in ownership or
control, and transfers made solely for personal “motives of business convenience”).
96. Compare id. at 1137 (articulating that the contested transfer occurred when the
owner of the Wallasey rental building transferred the property to a corporation wholly
owned and operated by him), with Alcazar, 981 A.2d at 1205 (describing that the first
transfer occurred when the Alcazar owner transferred the building into a trust
controlled by his wholly owned corporation and the second occurred when the Alcazar
owner sold the stock of his corporation controlling the trust to two individuals).
97. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 19, Alcazar Tenants’ Ass’n v. Smith Prop.
Holdings, L.P., 981 A.2d 1202 (D.C. 2009) (06-CV-0914) (distinguishing Wallasey by
relying heavily on the fact that the transfer in Wallasey resulted in neither a change in
control nor a change in ownership, as the original owner remained the owner after the
transfer).
98. See Wallasey, 892 A.2d at 1141 (holding that conveying property from the
original owner to a corporation wholly owned and controlled by the original owner
does not result in a change in control).
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economic gain prompted the transfer at issue in Alcazar; even the very
structure of the transfer contemplated a circumvention of TOPA’s
requirements, whereas desires to limit liability and tax prompted the
transfer at issue in Wallasey.99
The above analysis demonstrates that the Court of Appeals’ inconsistent
interpretation of “sale” and analysis under TOPA widely varies without
regard to the context of the contested transfer. Thus, the Court of Appeals’
allocation of differing levels of consideration to other factors in the TOPA
analysis is not surprising.
2. Failure to Recognize the Elements of a “Sale” Were Indisputably
Satisfied
Setting aside the Court of Appeals’ inconsistent reasoning and dismissal
of the ultimate effect of the contested transfers in Twin Towers and
Alcazar, the court failed to recognize that the contested transfers in both
cases met all the elements of a “sale” under TOPA.100
The court in Twin Towers grossly overlooked the obvious conclusion
that the transfer of 95% interest met the judicial definition of “sale.”101 The
court correctly identified the key elements of a “sale” to be the passing of
absolute title for consideration, but it failed to conclude that the transfer at
issue satisfied this two-pronged test.102
Unlike the Court of Appeals, the District of Columbia Superior Court
correctly held that the transfer at issue in Twin Towers constituted a “sale,”
thus triggering TOPA’s requirements.103 The Superior Court believed that
the transfer of 95% ownership interest in property decidedly resulted in the
99. Compare id. (recognizing that the motives of the parties were solely to decrease
taxes and limit liability), with Alcazar, 981 A.2d at 1205 (conceding that the parties’
motivations were for “tax reasons”).
100. See Twin Towers Plaza Ass’n v. Capital Park Assocs., 894 A.2d 1113, 1115-16
(D.C. 2006) (summarizing that the contentious transfer occurred when the owner of the
Twin Towers rental apartment building deeded 95% of his interest to a third party).
101. See id. at 1119 (holding that a 95% transfer of interest does not equate an
absolute transfer of interest). But see Gomez v. Independence Mgmt. of Del., Inc., 967
A.2d 1276, 1283 (D.C. 2009) (remanding to determine whether the transfer of 99%
interest is an absolute transfer of interest).
102. See Twin Towers, 894 A.2d at 1120 (articulating that a transfer amounting to
the passing of absolute ownership signifies a “sale”); see also Opening Brief of
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Twin Towers, supra note 79, at 6-7 (structuring the transfer
of the apartment building in a manner that utilized the rigid standard of “complete
ownership” to establish a loophole in TOPA and transfer interests without triggering
TOPA). But see Reply Brief for the Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Twin Towers, supra
note 23, at 2-3 (arguing that there is no possibility to circumvent TOPA by transferring
less than 100% interest (even 99%) because the de facto definition of a “sale” under
TOPA is the transfer of 100% interest only).
103. See Opening Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Twin Towers, supra note 79,
at 7 (summarizing the Superior Court’s findings that, as a matter of law, the transaction
was a sale).
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transfer of ownership and fundamental control over the property, as the
new owner or 95% interest holder held the majority control.104
Just as the Court of Appeals in Twin Towers failed to recognize a “sale,”
the same court in Alcazar similarly failed to recognize that the contested
transfers effectuated a “sale” for the purposes of TOPA.105 Unlike the onetime transfer at issue in Twin Towers, the transfer at issue in Alcazar
consisted of two transfers.106 The transfer of the entire ownership interest
in the Alcazar building, including its title, from the original owner to a new
and unrelated entity clearly meets the definition of “sale” as defined by
West End and its progeny.107 Ultimately, the transaction at issue resulted in
the full conveyance of the Alcazar building from Smith Property Holdings
to an outside party and thus clearly constituted a “sale.”108
3. Overlooking the Inexcusable: Ignoring Deceptive Motives Prompting
the Transfers
The Court of Appeals in both Twin Towers and Alcazar erroneously
overlooked the parties’ underlying motives and intentions that prompted
the transfers at issue.109 This failure directly contradicts the reasoning of
the court in Wallasey and Gomez.110
In Wallasey, the Court of Appeals deferred exclusively to the transferor’s
104. See id. (labeling the building owner’s position as “absurd” when the owner
attempted to define sale as strictly the transfer of 100% of all interests, and anything
short of that was not a sale).
105. See Alcazar Tenants’ Ass’n v. Smith Prop. Holdings, L.P., 981 A.2d 1202,
1206 (D.C. 2009) (holding that the transfer of title was not a sale under TOPA because
absolute title passed directly to the original grantor).
106. See id. (recognizing that the first transfer occurred when the owner transferred
the building into a trust and the subsequent transfer occurred when the owner sold his
ownership interest).
107. See Opening Brief of Appellants, Alcazar, supra note 97, at 15 (arguing that the
transfer of title from Smith Property Holdings and Smith Property Holdings’ Trust to
an entirely distinct and new organization effectuated the transfer of property and thus
met the definition of a “sale” because the owner exchanged absolute title to the
property for consideration of value).
108. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 10, Alcazar, 981 A.2d 1202(proclaiming that
the seller of the Alcazar agreed in a “Purchase and Sale Agreement” to transfer 100%
of his ownership interest and ownership benefits to a third party and thus “sold” the
Alcazar pursuant to the “absolute transfer” definition of “sale” in Twin Towers’ and
West End).
109. See, e.g., Alcazar, 981 A.2d at 1206 (examining testimony demonstrating the
parties intended to circumvent TOPA); Twin Towers Plaza Tenants Ass’n v. Capital
Park Assocs., 894 A.2d 1113, 1119 (D.C. 2006) (holding that the transfer of 95%
ownership interest is not a sale even though the parties expressly intended to avoid
TOPA’s requirements). But see Gomez v. Independence Mgmt. of Del., Inc., 967 A.2d
1276, 1280 (D.C. 2009) (describing the parties’ deliberate intentions to circumvent
TOPA).
110. See Wallasey Tenants Ass’n, v. Varner, 892 A.2d 1135, 1140 (D.C. 2006)
(exempting transfers prompted by “motives of business convenience” from complying
with TOPA).
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underlying reasons for transferring his property and established that
motives can be the dispositive factor categorizing a transfer as a nonsale.111 Effectively, Wallasey obliges the judiciary to inquire into the
motives underlying the transfer of rental property when determining
whether the transfer is exempt from TOPA’s requirements.112 In not giving
proper weight to the parties’ intentions and underlying motivations, the
Court of Appeals selectively applied portions of previous rationales,
contravened previous holdings, and disregarded TOPA’s protections.113
Unlike the Court of Appeals in both Twin Towers and Alcazar, the
Superior Court in Twin Towers rightfully recognized the importance of
subjective motives in prompting a transfer and, consistent with precedential
reasoning, deferred to the parties’ intentions to avoid TOPA when holding
that the transfer constituted a “sale.”114 Yet, the Court of Appeals in Twin
Towers strayed from this deferential determination and rejected the
Superior Court’s proper examination of the intent of the parties and the
motives prompting the transaction.115
The Court of Appeals in Alcazar further strayed from accepted
jurisprudence by applying Wallasey’s motive-based exceptions yet failing
to examine the parties’ actual motives.116 Wallasey’s exemptions can only
preclude TOPA after an examination of the motives prompting the transfer;
thus, the test for determining whether the Wallasey standard is satisfied
depends upon the motives of the parties.117 The Court of Appeals in
Alcazar failed even to consider the motives of the parties, yet held that the
transfer did not constitute a “sale” for the purposes of TOPA because

111. See id. (relying on personal motives to place a transfer effectuated in
furtherance of those motives outside the scope of TOPA).
112. See generally id. (relying solely on the rental housing owner’s subjective
motives prompting the transfer to determine whether the transfer fell within one of
TOPA’s exemptions).
113. See Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee in Opposition with Respect to the CrossAppeal, Twin Towers, supra note 55, at 20 (quoting the Court of Appeals’ self-imposed
prohibition against allowing a “pure formality” that creates statutory loopholes to
defeat “important legislative policies”).
114. See Opening Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Twin Towers, supra note 79,
at 7 (supporting the Superior Court’s conclusion that this transaction is a “sale” because
avoiding TOPA’s protections of tenants’ rights was the sole reason for the transaction).
115. See id. (emphasizing that the owner’s sole reason for transferring the property
was to circumvent TOPA’s protections).
116. See Reply Brief of Appellants, Alcazar, supra note 108, at 10 (revealing that
the parties structured the transfer precisely to avoid triggering TOPA’s right of first
refusal and thus Wallasey cannot apply because Wallasey did not involve a transfer to
an independent third party).
117. See id. at 13-14 (noting that intent is not applicable if the standard for
determining whether a “sale” occurred is based upon whether the transaction involved a
transfer of absolute title, but intent is very relevant in cases that focus on applying
Wallasey and the motives behind the transfer).
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Wallasey governed.118 However, the Court of Appeal’s failure to examine
motives in the Alcazar case effectively renders the Wallasey exemptions
invalid because the exemptions can only be applied if the motives so
demand.119
To apply a judicial exemption without analyzing the
dispositive factors determining whether the exemption’s elements are met
is a misguided application of law; thus, the Court of Appeals failed to defer
to the parties’ motives.120
D. Judicial Sponsored Circumvention of TOPA: The Effects of the
Improper Standard and What the Court of Appeals Should Have Done
The Court of Appeals’ restrictive application of its “absolute transfer”
standard provides rental housing owners with a legal means of
circumventing TOPA’s statutory requirements.121 Ultimately, the judicial
standard defeats the purposes of TOPA.122 Limiting “sales” to one-time
conveyances of owners’ entire interest in rental housing accommodations
established a history of jurisprudence that indirectly affords developers and
rental accommodation owners a means of transferring property without
regulation.123 These transfers directly result in the subjugation of lowincome tenants to the unregulated actions of new management or owners,
and produce an absurd effect contrary to the purposes of TOPA.124
The Court of Appeals made multiple errors when interpreting TOPA.
The most devastating of these errors was the Court of Appeals’ failure to
118. See Alcazar Tenants’ Ass’n v. Smith Prop. Holdings, L.P., 981 A.2d 1202,
1206 (D.C. 2009) (finding that the transfer from the original owner to a trust controlled
by the owner did not constitute a “sale” but was merely a change in the form of
ownership).
119. See Reply Brief of Appellants, Alcazar, supra note 108, at 14 (questioning
judicial discretion when the judiciary fails to examine subjective motives underlying a
consequently subjective exemption).
120. See Opposition Brief of the Appellees at 10, Alcazar, 981 A.2d 1202
(distinguishing the Court of Appeals’ failure to examine motives in Twin Towers
because this case applies Wallasey, and Twin Towers does not).
121. See id. at 23 (recognizing that by ignoring the motives of the parties or the
parties’ attempts to “evade” TOPA’s requirements, the Court of Appeals enforces a
loophole in TOPA).
122. See Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee in Response to the Supplemental Brief,
Twin Towers, supra note 72, at 2 (concluding that a rigid definition of “sale” would
eviscerate TOPA’s goals, as it ensures rental housing owners could always structure a
transfer to avoid conveying all their interest and thus circumvent the “complete
ownership” test, essentially making TOPA’s mandatory requirements voluntary).
123. See generally Alcazar, 981 A.2d 1202 (demonstrating that the result of
applying the Court of Appeals’ faulty narrow standard excluded a transfer that
ultimately had the same effect of a one-time “sale” because the multi-step transfer
resulted in the full conveyance from the original owner to a third party).
124. See Opening Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Twin Towers, supra note 79,
at 6-7 (reasoning that if the trial court had found the transaction was not a “sale,” the
holding would be contrary to legislative intent, absurd, and produce “obvious
injustice”).
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defer to the overall effect of the transfers at issue. The Court of Appeals’
failure in both Twin Towers and Alcazar resulted in the furtherance of
property owners’ interests by promoting development at the expense of
tenants.125 The court in West End refused to condone attempts to
“disguise” the nature of the transaction.126 Subsequent holdings likewise
obligate the judiciary to consider the overarching effect of transfers when
inquiring into whether a “sale” occurred for the purpose of TOPA.127
The failure to defer to the true nature of the contested conveyances
excluded multiple types of transfers that ultimately have the same effect as
a one-time “sale,” as exemplified in the holdings of Twin Towers and
Alcazar. The holding of Twin Towers effectively resulted in the transfer of
nearly complete management control to the new third-party owner and
precluded the application of TOPA.128 The Court of Appeals in Alcazar
examined each portion of the multi-step transaction as individual, separate,
and unrelated conveyances yet ignored the end result.129 If the court in
Alcazar had looked to the true nature of the transactions or examined the
individual transactions as a whole, it would have been unable to avoid the
clear conclusion that a “sale” occurred because the original grantor was not
the owner of the entities receiving the transfers.130
Had the Court of Appeals more broadly applied its “absolute transfer”
standard by examining the nature and ultimate effect of these transfers, it
could not dispute that each of the transfers in Twin Towers and Alcazar
constituted an “absolute transfer” of the rental housing accommodation and
thus met the definition of “sale.”131 Only an examination of the
transactions as a whole results in the conclusion that the transfer in both
125. See Alcazar, 981 A.2d at 1206 (refusing to examine the effect of the transfer as
one factor in determining whether a “sale” occurred).
126. See W. End Tenant Ass’n v. George Washington Univ., 640 A.2d 718, 729-30
(D.C. 1994) (averring that the transaction at issue would have been construed as a
“sale” if the parties had attempted to structure the agreement solely for the purpose of
avoiding TOPA).
127. See, e.g., Wallasey Tenants Ass’n v. Varner, 892 A.2d 1135, 1141 (D.C. 2006)
(requiring courts to examine the “true nature” of the transaction at issue when
determining whether it constituted a “sale”).
128. See Twin Towers Plaza Tenants Ass’n v. Capital Park Assocs., 894 A.2d 1113,
1119 (D.C. 2006) (recognizing that the transfer of the property ultimately resulted in
the transfer of absolute title one year after the conveyance of the 95% interest).
129. See Alcazar, 981 A.2d at 1206-07 (holding that TOPA was not applicable
because neither individual transfer constituted a sale).
130. See Reply Brief of Appellants, Alcazar, supra note 108, at 11 (distinguishing
Wallasey because, in Alcazar, the transaction directly resulted in a change in ownership
and control, and the parties intentionally structured the transaction to circumvent
TOPA’s obligations and thus the transfer clearly was not a restructuring for “business
convenience”).
131. See Opening Brief of Appellants, Alcazar, supra note 97, at 6-7 (articulating
that the parties carefully designed the transfers to result in the full conveyance of the
property).
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cases effected a complete change in the form of ownership.132 The Council
also recognized this oversight as significant and worthy of correction. The
Council subsequently amended TOPA to require the judiciary to examine
the overall substance of the transfers at issue. If the Court of Appeals had
properly interpreted TOPA and consistently applied its own standard, the
Council would not have needed to amend TOPA.
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The judicial standard effectively defeats the purposes of TOPA by
advancing a restrictive standard of “sale,” as opposed to furthering TOPA’s
actual purpose: to strengthen tenants’ rights.133 This Comment calls for a
reform to TOPA to ensure TOPA’s statutorily guaranteed protections
actually protect vulnerable tenants.134
TOPA provides a solid foundation for protecting tenants, but its
regulatory regime has limited powers because the Court of Appeals
incorporated a judicial standard that prevents TOPA from serving as an
effective regulatory mechanism that cuts against the negative effects of
conversion and gentrification.135 The Council acknowledged that the
judicial standard was misconstrued and indirectly furthers gentrification by
providing housing accommodation owners a means of circumventing
TOPA’s statutory requirements.136 However, acknowledgement of an
overly narrow standard is insufficient, and the Council must reevaluate
TOPA and promulgate clearer provisions to ensure TOPA’s purposes are
fulfilled.137

132. See generally Alcazar, 981 A.2d 1202 (describing the transfer of the Alcazar in
stages so as to avoid TOPA while underhandedly planning to effectuate a “sale” just as
contemplated by TOPA but in a manner that disguised the genuine nature of the
transfers).
133. See Columbia Plaza Tenants’ Ass’n v. Columbia Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 869 A.2d
329, 332 (D.C. 2005) (recognizing that courts should give TOPA “sensible
construction” or an interpretation that does not result in “obvious injustice,” thus the
judicially defined terms must not be at a variance with the overarching policy of
TOPA).
134. See Powell & Spencer, supra note 3, at 450 (accusing states of “fueling”
gentrification through the removal of development regulations, legislative inaction, and
judicial sanction).
135. See Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee in Opposition with Respect to the CrossAppeal, Twin Towers, supra note 55, at 9 (recognizing that the current definition of
“sale” allows owners to avoid TOPA by retaining, for example, a meager 1% interest in
the property).
136. See Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act of 1980, D.C. CODE § 42-3401.01
(2001) (acknowledging that the housing crisis persists largely due to ineffective
conversion controls).
137. See Powell & Spencer, supra note 3, at 459 (providing statistics demonstrating
a 50% increase in the cost of housing in “gentrified areas,” whereas other areas of the
District of Columbia only experience a 15% increase).
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The Council’s attempts to address the judicial standard in 2005 failed, as
it still allows for the judicial standard to govern transfers pursuant to
subsection (a). The Council needs to readdress the judicial standard by
promulgating amendments to broaden the scope of TOPA.138 The new
provision that now requires an examination of the overall effect of the
transfer seems to conflict directly with TOPA itself. The Council must
clearly define the term “sale” in order to invalidate the holdings of West
End and its progeny. TOPA’s purposes will continue to be defeated if the
Council and the judiciary fail to redefine “sale,” as vulnerable populations
cannot avail themselves of TOPA’s protections and will continue to suffer
the negative social effects of unregulated conversion and gentrification.139
V. CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals wrongfully defined “sale”
and improperly applied its standard to hold against the interests of
tenants.140 In allowing property owners to transfer almost all of their
ownership interest in property without affording the tenants their statutory
right of first refusal, the judiciary is sponsoring the development of the
District of Columbia at the cost of negatively impacting the vulnerable
populations TOPA is meant to protect.141 The misapplication of the
judicial test for determining whether a transaction is a “sale” under TOPA
has resulted in the furtherance of gentrification, judicial-sponsored
injustices, and, ultimately, rendered TOPA ineffective.142 To prevent this
urban segregation and protect vulnerable populations, the Council needs to
more affirmatively amend TOPA by directly defining “sale” in a way that
expressly overrules the judicial standard.

138. See Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee in Opposition with Respect to the CrossAppeal, Twin Towers, supra note 55, at 12-13 (showing that the Council promulgated
the 2005 amendments only after extensive hearings resulted in the Council agreeing
that TOPA will effectively protect tenants if “sale” includes conveyances effectuating
the “actual transfer of possession and control of a rental building”).
139. See O’Toole & Jones, supra note 28, at 368-69 (summarizing the “overarching
purpose” of TOPA as stopping the “rapid loss of affordable rental housing”).
140. See, e.g., Twin Towers Plaza Tenants Ass’n v. Capital Park Assocs., 894 A.2d
1113, 1119 (D.C. 2006) (finding that the owner of the rental housing did not need to
comply with TOPA and thus did not need to provide the tenants with their statutory
right of first refusal).
141. Cf. Powell & Spencer, supra note 3, at 458-59 (reiterating that the housing
crisis in the District of Columbia continues today by providing statistics that 56,000
African Americans have fled the city; specifically, these “departing blacks” account for
“nearly all of the city’s population loss”).
142. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 8, at 86 (explaining how the government’s
failure to effectively regulate conversion results in unregulated urban development and
adversely impacts low-income populations).
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